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1Assets, Attributes, and Ownership
Abstract
The notion of full asset ownership is important in economics, for
example, in recent work on the boundaries of the firm, which has
been taken up with the issue why it matters who owns an asset.
However, recognizing that assets have multiple attributes, and that
these may be subject to capture in world of positive measurement
and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of full asset ownership
is problematic.  New property theorists sidestep these issues by
implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly
enforced (i.e., full asset ownership obtains).  We discuss the notion of
property rights and ownership in a positive enforcement and
measurement cost setting, and suggest that the new property rights
model is a part of a more overarching perspective, which also
includes older contributions to property rights economics.
2Introduction
Considered from an economic point of view, what does it mean to own an
asset?  Until the publication of Coase (1960), this issue did not receive much
attention from economists.  However, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed intensive
debate on aspects of the issue of asset ownership within what we here call “the
old property rights approach” (henceforth, the “OPRA”) (Alchian 1965;
Demsetz 1967; Barzel 1997).  Much of that work was taken up with identifying
differences between alternative systems of property rights as alternative
ownership arrangements (collective vs private ownership).  However, the
economic meaning of asset ownership was never precisely pinned down in this
literature (“Ownership and Property Rights in the “Old” Property Rights
Approach”).
Instead, attention has since the mid-1980s turned to the related issue of
why it matters who owns an asset – the key concern of what is here called “the
new property rights approach” (henceforth, the “NPRA”) (Grossman and Hart
1986; Hart 1995) (“Ownership and Property Rights in the “New” Property Rights
Approach”).  However, as we shall argue in this paper, understanding the issue
of “why it matters who owns an asset” is made problematic by the fact that the
very meaning of asset ownership is still not fully clear.  More specifically, we
argue that there are suppressed issues in the NPRA that relate to the meanings
and functions of asset ownership.  In our view, the NPRA builds on somewhat
extreme assumptions, for example, that ownership is perfectly and costlessly
enforceable.1   Thus, the issue of the meaning of asset ownership under less than
costless enforcement is suppressed.
Characterizing approaches as “new” and “old” may invoke an image of
unbroken and unambiguous scientific advance.  As already indicated, we
                                                 
1 The more methodological aspects of this are treated in greater detail in Brousseau and Fares
(1999) and Foss and Foss (2000).
3consider this view false with respect to the specific approaches under
consideration here.  Seemingly, the NPRA has been able to resolve a number of
unresolved problems that beset the OPRA, such as the central issue of what it
means to own an asset.  The notion of residual rights of control seems to offer a
clear-cut answer to this.  However, we shall argue that this notion amounts to
sidestepping a number of important issues that the OPRA wrestled with.
Among these are the problems posed for the notion of ownership of multi-
attribute assets, the composite nature of ownership with respect to rights, and
the distinction between the formal (legally defined) structure of ownership and
the real structure, as defined partly by agents’ capture of property rights.   A
critique informed by OPRA thus reveals the partial nature of NPRA (“Some
Problems in the New Property Rights Approach”).  For example, we shall point out
that with a broader and more realistic notion of residual rights one may obtain
other results with respect to ownership patterns than those obtained in the
NPRA.  We show this by means of a simple example (“Toward a Broader
Understanding of Ownership Patterns”).
Perhaps because of a surprising lack of interaction among OPRA and
NPRA writers,2 these points have, to our knowledge, not been developed in the
earlier literature.  There are, however, similarities to other contributions,
notably Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994).
Like these writers, our aim is integrative.  Thus, we are interested in making
both more precise and encompassing the notion of ownership in order to more
clearly identify the implications of ownership for economic organization.
                                                                                                                                    
2 Werin and Wijkander (1992) appears to be the sole exception.
4Ownership and Property Rights in
 the “Old” Property Rights Approach
Property Rights in Coase (1960)
The pioneering paper on the economics of property rights is
conventionally and justifiably taken to be Coase (1960).  In this paper, Coase
examines the economic implications of the allocation of legally delineated rights
(liability rights) to a subset of the total uses of an asset, namely those that have
external effects on the value of other agents’ abilities to exercise their use rights
over assets.  As a part of his critique of the Pigovian tradition in welfare
economics (see Demsetz 1996), Coase (1960: 155) notes that a reason for the
failure of this tradition to fully come to grips with the externality issue lies in its
“faulty concept of a factor of production,” which – according to Coase – should
be thought of, not as a physical entity but as a right to perform certain actions.
These rights are property rights.  Given this, private ownership is defined as the
possession of “the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions” (idem.), that
is, private ownership of an asset is the possession of a vector of rights to use
that asset.3 The vector of rights is circumscribed partly by legal or governmental
restrictions, partly by the ability of the holder to exclude other agents from the
specific uses defined by the rights.  Thus, in Coase’s view ownership does not
provide the owner with exclusive rights to assets, only to certain uses of the
asset.
However, ownership per se does not appear to be what primarily interests
Coase; his major concern is the allocation of use rights.  In principle, this
allocation is conceptually separate from the issue of ownership, since one can
imagine that all possible uses (including future ones) of assets are known and
                                                 
3 In the following, we shall simply treat ”private ownership” and ”ownership” as synonymous,
unless otherwise stated.
5can be contracted for.  Thus, one can conceptually analyze the allocation of use
rights without involving the notion of ownership at all, as in complete
contracting theories (e.g., agency theory).  Coase does not use this construct,
though, but rather the zero transaction cost setting underlying the Coase
theorem. In this setting, the concept of ownership and the issue of who owns an
asset are truly insignificant.  Even when Coase relaxes the strict zero transaction
cost assumption, his interest lies more in understanding the allocative
consequences of different legal delimitations of use rights than in ownership
issues.  Thus, a major problem left unaddressed by Coase is how much one
needs to “relax” the assumptions underlying the Coase theorem to produce a
role for ownership.
Ownership in the “Old” Property Rights Approach
Coase’s paper gave rise to a spate of work on property rights and
ownership (e.g., Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1964, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1972;
Barzel 1982, 1987, 1994, 1997, 1999; Cheung 1969a&b, 1983; Umbeck 1981), that
is, the OPRA.  In retrospect, it is possible to see much of this work as
concentrating on clarifying issues relating to ownership that Coase had not
mentioned or had left as puzzles in the 1960 paper.  These issues concern the
meaning of ownership, the relationship between property rights and
ownership, and the importance of legal considerations for understanding
ownership.
Recall that Coase had simply thought of ownership as the possession of
some vector of use rights over an asset.  In itself, this raises questions such as:
How much exclusivity over uses of assets is required before one qualifies as
“owner”? Moreover, Coase’s understanding left unresolved the role played by
other types of economic rights than use rights – such as income rights or rights
to alienate the asset - in the understanding of ownership. What economic
considerations determine the concentration of these types rights in the hand of
6one person?  Finally, what is the role played by legal considerations in the
understanding of ownership; for example, is it possible (and/or desirable) to
completely divorce economic and legal notions of ownership?
The OPRA literature of the 1960s and 1970s4 only partially succeeded in
giving answers to the puzzles left by Coase.  Common to the various
contributions to the OPRA is the overall conceptualization of property rights as
social relations pertaining to the use of scarce resources and supported
(enforced) by the formal laws, mores and customs of a social system (Alchian
1965; Demsetz 1967) as well as by private enforcement (Umbeck 1981; Barzel
1997).  Furthermore, the literature developed a more refined categorization of
property rights, for example, introducing distinctions between use rights,
income rights, rights to exclude, and rights to alienate assets.  Given this, the
concept of ownership becomes linked to the possession of different types of
property rights, so that ownership also becomes contingent on the factors that
regulate the interaction among agents with respect to scarce resources and is
typically used when property rights are bundled (Alchian 1965).
However, there is still much vagueness in the OPRA literature about what
truly distinguishes an owner from a non-owner.  There are two main
manifestations of this vagueness.  The first one is ambiguity with respect to
which bundles of rights one has to possess in order to be identified as owner.
The second one is an ambiguity with respect to the extent to which ownership is
defined by the recognition of others of a claim to ownership, that is, the extent
to which exclusivity is based on a (explicit or implicit) recognition by other
parties of the property rights of the owner or by the owner’s own ability to
maintain exclusivity.
With respect to the first type of ambiguity, it is notable that ownership
tends to be defined depending on the analytical purpose.  For example,
                                                 
4  Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) is a classical overview of the early research.
7Demsetz and Alchian both put much emphasis on the rights to exclude and
alienate as the relevant criteria of private ownership in their work on systems of
property rights, and see owners as those agents who can exercise these rights
(Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1967).  However, they slightly change these latter
criteria when they analyze the organization of the firm and corporate
governance, where owners becomes defined as those possessing control rights
(Demsetz 1967) or residual income rights (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  With
respect to the second ambiguity, the OPRA literature is confused on the issue of
how many rights must be exclusive in order for ownership to obtain, and what
are the determinants of exclusivity of rights.  For example, does ownership
mean that the owner can exclude others from any use of his asset (as in Alchian
1965), or does ownership allow for some sharing of use rights (as in Coase
1960)?
Strategies for Dealing with the Ambiguities of Ownership
Such ambiguities have often been recognized by OPRA writers
themselves. “The meaning of full private ownership … is vague,” Demsetz
(1988: 19) notes, although he thinks that “ … certain rights of action loom more
important than others.  Exclusivity and alienabiliy are among them.”  Given the
complexity and ambiguity surrounding the economic notion of ownership,
several strategies of clarification appear to have been explored by OPRA
writers.
One is to drop the concept entirely for purposes of economic analysis
(while recognizing that the concept makes perfect legal sense), and instead
concentrate exclusively on property rights.   This seems to be reflected in
Coase’s (1960) reluctance the use the concept of ownership.  However, this
strategy arguably runs into problems in the face of unforeseen uses of assets.  In
                                                                                                                                    
8this case, there is a need for an institution that allocates these use rights.  In fact,
this institution is normally called private ownership.
A second strategy is to adopt a working definition of ownership as always
comprising a certain minimum bundle of property rights, irrespective of time,
place and institutions.5  For example, one may argue that ownership is
fundamentally defined by exclusivity and alienability.  An obvious problem
with this strategy is that, for example, it is unclear what is meant by exclusivity
independently of institutional and historical considerations.
A third strategy, therefore, is to identify ownership with claims to
exclusivity that are privately enforced and/or are enforced by various legal and
non-legal institutions.  This strategy, which may be associated with Umbeck
(1981), makes ownership contingent on what is historically seen as constituting
a recognized claim.  More specifically, “... the abilities of individuals, or groups
of individuals, to forcefully maintain exclusivity” (Umbeck 1981: 39) are
different across spatio-temporal and institutional characteristics, since they turn
on positions of power and the ability to exercise force.  Thus, ownership
essentially becomes an expectation that an agent holds with respect to his
ability to use certain resources.  This view makes it clear that answering the
question “why it matters who owns an asset” must be heavily dependent upon
the concrete institutions and allocations of force that define and enforce the
rights of the owner — an insight that we shall make extensive use of in the
following.
Barzel on Attributes and Assets
A particularly interesting OPRA contribution is represented by the work
of Barzel (1982, 1987, 1994, 1997, 1999).  Barzel’s work is particularly useful with
                                                 
5 The economic reason for the existence of such a bundle can be found in the existence of
transaction costs which imply that “… the partitioned rights will re-aggregated into more
convenient clusters of rights” (Alchian 1965: 134).
9respect to make problematic the issue of “why it matters who owns an asset.”
His central contribution, which we shall make use of the following, is to
introduce the notion of multi-attribute assets and to argue that it is more fruitful
to focus on the ownership of attributes rather than of assets.  Attributes are
characteristics and possible uses of assets.6  To Barzel, it is crucial that
ownership in the economic sense pertains to the attributes of assets rather than to
the assets themselves.  There are two reasons for this.
The first one is that most assets have so many attributes - of which many
may not be specified  - that the notion of ownership of assets is vague.7  This
also explains why Barzel makes a categorical distinction between legal and
economic notions of ownership.  Whereas the former refers to a legally
recognized holding of a title to an asset, the latter refers to those property rights
over the attributes of an asset that are controlled by an agent.  Nevertheless the
concept of asset must remain important in economic analysis (and not just in
property law).  This is because it is often assets rather than attributes that are
priced (because of measurement costs).  Agents then may have different
degrees of control over attributes of assets and thus more or less secure
economic rights over the asset. Barzel (1994: 394; emphasis in original) explains
economic rights as
... an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to
directly consume the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly
through exhange. A key word is ability: The definition is concerned
not with what people are legally entitled to do but with what they
believe they can do.
                                                 
6 Thus, although Barzel does not mention this, the notion of ”attributes” also covers contingent
goods, such as the use of an umbrella at noon 16 April 2001 in Cambridge if it rains.
7 This is related to Demsetz’ point that the notion of ”full private ownership” over assets is
”vague”, and his argument that “[i]n one sense, it must always remain so, for there is an infinity
of potential rights of actions that can be owned … It is impossible to describe the complete set of
rights that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz 1988: 19).
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However, the expected valuation of an asset depends on the attributes of the
asset that one holds property rights over, so that attributes remain the
fundamental unit of analysis.
The second reason for focusing on attributes rather than on assets is that
Barzel’s central concern is to determine the structure of ownership that will
maximize the value of an asset when there are high measurement costs. High
measurement costs implies that it will be efficient to leave some attributes
unspecified.  Allocation of ownership to such attributes takes place by means of
capture.  Those unspecified attributes that are captured become subject to
control by agents, where by “control” is meant “… one’s freedom to manipulate
the particular unspecified attribute without making marginal payments to
others ” (Barzel 1999: 5-6).  The efficient pattern of ownership over the attributes
of an asset is the one that minimizes uncompensated exploitation of attributes –
which is a sophisticated restatement of the Coasian (1960) concern with the
internalization of externalities.  Relatedly, Barzel, like Coase, stresses that
ownership — whether to attributes of assets or to assets themselves  — is
seldom fully exclusive.  The refinement introduced by Barzel relative to Coase
consists in adding the notion of measurement costs which explains the presence
of unspecified attributes, attempts to capture these, and the institutions that
constrain capture.
Although a focus on the multiple attributes of assets rather than on the
assets themselves is an extremely helpful perspective that we shall make use of
later, it may be necessary to warn against completely neglecting transactions
relating to assets (rather than to attributes).  This is because the legal system
and jurisprudence distinguishes between the law relating to contract and the
law relating to ownership of assets.  Moreover, the law relating to ownership is
more than simply part of a low-cost enforcement institution; it is also a
“standard contract” that reduces information and communication costs and has
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allocative consequences for this reason.  Moreover, legal ownership may also be
perceived of as a property rights system in the sense that it is a low-cost way of
allocating hitherto undiscovered uses of assets.  For example, giving somebody
legal ownership implies that he holds the legal right to future, as yet
undiscovered, attributes of the asset, in the sense that the courts will not
interfere with the use of the asset by the party identified as the owner.8 As we
shall see, this is a crucial point in the NPRA.
Ownership and Property Rights in
the New Property Rights Approach
In the same way that the emergence of OPRA may conveniently and justifiably
be dated to the publication of Coase (1960), the emergence of NPRA can be
dated, just as conveniently and justifiably, to the publication of Grossman and
Hart (1986).  The approach outlined in that paper has swept economics and it is
not too much off the mark to say that it defines the way the modern formal
economist thinks about ownership and property rights.9  In the following, we
shall mostly refer to and rely on Hart’s (1995) recent authoritative and widely
cited statement of the fundamentals of the NPRA.10
                                                 
8 Thanks to Thomas Riis and an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point.
9 In addition to the issues traditionally considered in the theory of the firm - such as the
boundaries of the firm - the NPRA has been applied to, for example, corporate finance (Hart
1995), corporate governance, the organization of production in public versus private firms, and
the boundaries of knowledge-intensive firms (Brynjolfsson 1994).  Moreover, the approach is
continuously being refined (notably Rabin 1993; Farrell and Gibbons 1995; Noeldeke and
Schmidt 1995; Hart and Moore 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998), and extended, for example,
combined with ideas from principal-agent theory (Holmström and Milgrom 1991, 1994).
10  To the best of our knowledge and understanding, our points also applies to more formal
statements of the NPRA, such as Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990, 1994, 1998),
Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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Answers to the Coasian Puzzles in the New Property Rights Approach
Recall that Coase (1960) had left unaddressed a number of issues
concerning the meaning of ownership, the relationship between property rights
and ownership, and the importance of legal considerations for understanding
ownership.  The OPRA was only partially successful in constructing a unified
and consistent approach to these issues.  There are many reasons for this
limited success, such as a verbal style of theorizing, the lack of one well-defined
problem that could structure analysis towards a more consistent approach, and
a willingness to let definitions depend on the analytical purpose at hand.  In
contrast, the NPRA is explicitly formal, most of the analysis has centered on the
problem of vertical integration, and it has, because of its formal nature, adopted
(seemingly) unambiguous definitions. This has allowed its proponents to state
straightforward answers to the puzzles left by Coase.
With respect to the meaning of ownership and how it relates to property
rights, the central idea in NPRA is the distinction between specific rights of
control and residual rights of control. The former can be delineated and directly
allocated through contractual means, whereas the latter is obtained through the
legal ownership of assets and implies the “… right to decide usages of the asset
in uncontracted-for contingencies” (Hart 1996: 371).  However, residual rights
to control encompass not only the rights to use assets, but also to “… decide
when or even whether to sell the asset” (Hart 1995: 65).   In NPRA ownership is
defined as the legally enforced possession of an asset.  The economic
importance of ownership stems from the owner’s ability to exercise residual
rights of control over the assets.  This economic conception is thus explicitly
derived from the juristic conception.11  In other words, the function of
                                                                                                                                    
11 In support of this, the noted American legal scholar and judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes is
quoted (in Hart 1995: 30n): “But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the
same as those incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is
allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is more or
13
ownership is to allocate residual rights of control.  Thus, the meaning of
ownership, and its relation to property rights and the legal system are
addressed in a straightforward manner.
As we shall later argue, however, reflection and evidence suggest that the
notion of residual rights of control is not so unambiguous after all; in actuality,
the specific meaning that NPRA writers attach to the concept is strongly
dependent on background institutions, notably the ability to costlessly enforce
ownership.  This has implications for the economic understanding of the
allocation of ownership, as we shall later show.  Also, the limitations of the
NPRA with respect to explaining legal ownership should be clearly understood.
The NPRA is not a law and economics theory of the legal institution of
ownership per se, but rather a theory of the efficient allocation of ownership.
Before we enter into a more sustained critical discussion of the NPRA, we need
to more fully characterize the NPRA.
Complete and Incomplete Contracts and Economic Organization
A crucial distinction in the NPRA is the distinction between complete and
incomplete contracts, a distinction that was never made explicit in the OPRA.12
To make clear the importance of this distinction has been one of the major
analytical strengths of the NPRA.  In the literature two causes of contractual
incompleteness are emphasized.  One is a bounded rationality interpretation,
according to which some future states cannot be anticipated, although the
agents may hold a probability distribution over the pay-offs from their relation
(Grossman and Hart 1986).13  Alternatively, all states are in fact anticipated, but
for some reason agents are unable to specify their plans or the nature of these
                                                                                                                                    
less protected in excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed to
exclude all, and is accountable to no one.”
12 Although Coase (1937) had of course focused on incomplete contracts.
13  For a critique of this, see Kreps (1996).
14
states in such a way that a court can ascertain whether a certain plan was
carried out or a state materialized.  The contract is left incomplete for this
reason (Hart and Moore 1990).
According to NPRA writers, incompleteness of contracts makes it possible
to understand the economic function of ownership.  The argument is that if one
accepts that ownership confers residual rights to control, it must follow that it is
only possible to understand the economic consequences of ownership under
incomplete contracting,14 for the basic reason that residual rights of control are
only defined when this kind of contracting obtains.15 In the terminology that we
use here, these control rights refer to the holder’s ability to manipulate
unspecified attributes in the future without making marginal payments to
others.  Note, however, that there is no mention in the NPRA of the holder’s
ability to manipulate unspecified attributes without making marginal payments
to others in a setting where all — present and future— contingencies and
attributes are known, but where there may be costs of measurement and
enforcement (as in Demsetz 1988; Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Barzel 1999).
We shall later focus on this possibility by means of an example.
The implication of the NPRA reasoning is that theories that are based on
an complete contract logic, such as OPRA (?) or formal agency theory, cannot
explain neither the allocation of ownership over asset, nor the owner of an
                                                                                                                                    
14 However, this does not mean that ownership as a legal category cannot exist under complete
contracting.
15 Incomplete contracting implies that some actions and payments will have to be determined ex
post. The difference between complete and incomplete contracting also has to do with the role of
the court.  In complete contracting theories, courts are assumed to enforce the original
agreement, and ordering is efficacious, even if all information may not be available to the court.
This is in contrast to the incomplete contracting approach where the incompleteness of contracts
introduces opportunities for recontracting and where court enforcement of the original terms
would leave gains from trade unrealized given the information available to courts at the time
performance takes place.
15
asset.16 An important further implication is that these theories cannot address
the issue of the boundaries of the firm, the main issue of concern of the NPRA.
In contrast, Hart argues that the NPRA can unambigiously define the owner of
an asset.  This is particularly important for the analysis of the boundaries of the
firm.
The Basic NPRA Set-Up
Historically and conceptually, the NPRA has been developed in the
context of the theory of the firm, more precisely the analysis of the vertical
boundaries of the firm (Grossman and Hart 1986) (Demsetz 1998).  Applied to
firms, the approach begins from the idea that ownership of non-human assets is
what defines the firm.  Thus if two different assets are owned by one person, we
are dealing with one firm, whereas if the same two assets are owned by
different persons, we are dealing with two different firms.  The assets that are
relevant here are non-human assets, since human assets are non-alienable. The
importance of non-human assets derives from their (potential) function as
bargaining levers in situations that are not covered by contract.  This may be
crucially important in situations where the parties have invested in specific
assets - notably, investments in the parties’ own human capital - and these
assets are complementary to specific non-human assets. Crucially, the parties’
investments in human assets are assumed to be non-contractible.
                                                 
16 Complete contracting obtains when contracts are such that they have “… the relevant
decisions (transfer, trade, etc.) depend on all verifiable variables, including possible
announcements by the parties (concerning their valuation, costs, etc.)” (Tirole 1988: 29n).  In
such a contracting regime, there will be no need for residual rights of control.  Thus, Hart (1995:
5) argues that “…[i]f contracting costs are zero, we can sign a rental agreement that is as
effective as a change in ownership.  In particular, the rental contract can specify exactly what I
can do with the machine, when I can have access to it, what happens if the machine breaks
down, what rights you have to use the machine, and so on.  Given this, however, it is unclear
why changes in asset ownership ever need take place.”  Note how this quotation indicates that
the NPRA is really a theory of the allocation of ownership in a setting where ownership is a
perfectly well-defined concept.   This may be contrasted with the analysis of the emergence of
the institution of ownership in, for example, Umbeck (1981).
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All bargaining that follows after the parties have made their investments
in human assets is assumed to be efficient (in contrast to, e.g., Williamson 1996).
Therefore, the model revolves around the effect of ownership of non-human
assets on the incentives to invest in human assets.   Specifically, bargaining
determines the allocation of returns from investments, so that each party gets
his opportunity cost plus a share (they are assumed to share 50 : 50) of the
(verifiable) profit stream.  Since in this set-up individual returns will differ from
social returns, and agents are sufficiently farsighted to foresee this, investments
will be inefficient. It is possible to influence the investment of one of the parties
positively by reallocating ownership rights to non-human assets.  A reallocation
of ownership of physical assets alters the parties’ opportunity costs of non-
cooperation (the status quo point) after the specific investments have been
made, and thus the expected payoffs from the investments.17  However, this
comes only at the cost of reducing one of the parties’ investment incentives
(excepting the situation in which the parties’ marginal costs of investment are
equal).  This trade-off determines allocation of ownership and hence the
efficient boundaries of the firm.  Thus, the central issue is why it matters who
owns an asset or a bundle of assets.  Underlying this is that it is possible to
unambiguously identify the owner of an asset.
                                                 
17 However, there are certain problems of defining all relevant opportunity costs in an
incomplete contract world.  Contractual incompleteness may be due to high costs of specifying
and verifying certain uses of assets, the lack of ability to foresee all possible uses of assets, or the
lack of ability to foresee all future contingencies. In the two latter cases, the opportunity cost of
non-corporation may be ill-defined, simply because future contingencies may change what are
the best alternative uses of assets and these contingencies may not be foreseen. Thus,
opportunity costs may change as new opportunities or contingencies become apparent and
change the bargaining power of the parties and the value to the parties of ownership over
assets.  However, this is not part of the NPRA approach.
17
Some Problems in the New Property Rights Approach
In this section, we shall argue that the NPRA claim of being able to
unambiguously identify the owner of an asset is strongly dependent on the
specific analytical set-up adopted by most NPRA writers.18 This set-up is
characterized by an implicit assumption of zero cost enforcement of ownership
(i.e., residual rights of control) and thus full exclusivity in the use of assets.  In
other words, the NPRA implicitly black-boxes part of the institutional
environment (Brousseau and Fares 1998).  In more realistic settings,
characterized by positive costs of enforcement, measurement costs and multi-
attribute assets (but not necessarily asymmetric information among the
contractual parties), it may be more problematic to single out an owner of an
asset.  As we shall point out, the rather extreme set-ups that characterize most
NPRA models also account for their inability to discriminate between a number
of ownership arrangements, such as vertical quasi-integration and vertical
integration.
The Notion of Residual Rights of Control
At first glance the NPRA notion of residual rights of control appears to be
a conceptual sword that cut through the Gordian knot of the meaning of
ownership in the literature.  However, on closer inspection the concept turns
out to be not completely unambiguous.  We here discuss whether residual
rights of control unambiguously identify an owner.  We shall argue that  this
depends on the divisibility and enforceability of these rights.  Consider the
divisibility issue first.
In a discussion of the connection between ownership, residual control
rights, and residual income rights, Hart (1995: 63-66) notes that the latter is “...
                                                 
18 In his review of Hart (1995), Demsetz (1999: 449; emphasis in original) also notes that ”Hart
writes as though he thinks that asset ownership is an unambiguous concept.”
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not a very robust or interesting theoretical concept” (1995: 64).19 The reason
given is that residual income rights are not well defined since they can easily be
divided which residual control rights cannot “in the same way” (p.64n).  It is
not clear what he has in mind here, but presumably Hart means that it is non-
sensical to allocate residual rights of control ex ante between parties. For
example, it does not make sense to ex ante allocate 80 % of the residual rights
control to one party (which of course is possible in the case of residual income
rights).
However, this view neglects that assets have many attributes – and formal
control over such attributes may be divided. For example, one may imagine
joint ownership of a taxicab, where one chauffeur drives it on Monday to
Wednesday (one attribute), and the other one drives it from Wednesday to
Sunday (another attribute), both having full rights to the use of the asset within
certain pre-negotiated contractual stipulations. Timesharing of condominiums
is another quite prevalent phenomenon that also illustrates the division of
control over attributes. Based on this alone, it is not easy to say who is the
“true” owner.
However, Hart has a way out.  He admits that residual rights of control
are in fact divisible, for example, when he talks about “forms of intermediate
ownership” (p.61).20 But he is quick to add that included in the notion of
residual rights to control are also the rights to veto the use of an asset and to
alienate that asset – and these rights are not divisible.  In the context of the
example above, one of the taxi drivers thus got to be the ultimate owner.  Even
this will not do, however, as Hart’s own work on cooperatives illustrates (Hart
                                                 
19 Hart’s specific reasoning on this is not easy to follow, however.  He argues that ”[g]iven that
profit-sharing contracts are not in principle costlty to write if profits are verifiable (and it is
unclear how residual income is to be allocated if profits are not verifiable), the conclusion is that
residual income may not be a very robust or interesting theoretical concept” (1995: 63-64).  This
would seem to be a non sequitur.
20  In this connection he refers to delegation (citing Aghion and Tirole 1997).
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and Moore 1994).  In a cooperative (or partnership) control is exercised by
means of majority rule.  But this implies that no single agent or group of agents
can have a veto.  In turn this means that if ownership is in fact identical to the
right to veto, the ownership of a cooperative may be completely fleeting.
A final problem concerns the claim in the NPRA that residual rights of
control are only indirectly tradable through the exchange of ownership titles.
But this may not be the case in certain contexts (cf. also Demsetz 1998).  For
example, leasing on a long term basis may effectively be identical to obtaining
ownership, particularly if the leasing arrangement lasts through the economic
lifetime of the asset (Wiggins 1991: 610n) or if the arrangement comes with a
first-buy clause.
Asymmetric Treatment of Enforcement
In a number of contributions to the OPRA, there is an explicit distinction
between the legal formal title to assets and the economic rights to those assets
(e.g., Coase 1960; Alchian 1965; Barzel 1997).  In the presence of costs of
measurement and enforcement, this distinction is important for any asset,
whether human capital assets or non-human capital assets.  While there is thus
a symmetric treatment of the two asset categories in the OPRA, the treatment in
NPRA is asymmetric.  This is because ownership to, and contracts over,
physical assets are supposed to be fully and costlessly enforced by the legal
system, whereas contracts involving investments in human capital are assumed
to be completely unenforceable because of an asserted non-verifiability. Thus,
in the NPRA approach there is only one clearly identified possibility of capture,
namely with respect to capturing other parties’ investments in their own
human capital.   However, in actuality there are other capture possibilities –
because of the simultaneous presence of high costs of enforcement and multi-
attribute assets - but these are assumed away in the NPRA by the assumption
of costless enforcement.
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Some Empirical Anomalies
The neglect in the NPRA of the multi-attribute nature of assets and of
positive measurement and enforcement costs means that the NPRA has
difficulties coming to grips with a number of real-world phenomena.  Among
these is the difference between quasi-vertical integration and full integration, a
distinction that relates to the understanding of the employment contract.
Quasi-vertical integration is the ownership arrangement of one firm owning
a number of the specific assets used by, for example, its supplier.  Under full
integration the manager of supplier is turned into an employee of the firm.
However, the economic rationales behind these two ownership arrangements
are hard to distinguish in the NPRA. Note that quasi-vertical integration may
be seen as an attempt to protect against hold-up on the part of the supplier -
that is, exactly what vertical integration is supposed to do.  Moreover, note that
on the NPRA logic (Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995, 1996), the manager-owner
of the supplier firm in a quasi-vertical integration relation has decreased
incentives to invest in his human capital, exactly as if he had been turned into an
employee of the firm.  The relative bargaining positions of the parties with
respect to sharing the joint surplus from their relation would appear to be the
same under the two arrangements (ceteris paribus).
As this indicates, it is difficult to explain the employment contract using the
NPRA; in fact, the existence of that contract is simply taken for granted in the
NPRA.  Hart (1995: 71) refers to the idea that a benefit of the employment
contract is that carrying out activities within a firm means that information may
be exchanged more readily. The reason, Hart speculates, is that the employer’s
control over assets gives him bargaining power over the employee, which
implies that the employee may have an incentive to establish himself as reliable,
hence, valuable to the employer and thus possibly increasing his future wage.
However, one may counter that quasi-vertical integration may accomplish
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exactly the same, since ownership of the specific assets of another firm would
have the same effect on information revelation. The NPRA approach may
explain authority, but it does not explain the employment contract.
The inability of the NPRA to come to grips with these phenomena has to
do with its neglect of the multi-attribute nature of assets in a setting with
measurement and enforcement cost (where the latter depends on the
institutional environment).  In such a setting, an agent may engage in capture of
unspecified attributes of assets that goes beyond the types of capture
investigated by the NPRA, namely under-investment in human capital or hold-
up.  Making telephone calls to friends in far-away countries, using company
cars for holiday trips, withholding effort, inefficiently using or maintaining
assets, etc. are all examples of capture that cannot easily be pressed into the
NPRA categories of hold-up or under-investment in human capital.  However,
such activities may be essential for discriminating between vertical integration
and quasi-vertical integration, that is, explaining the employment contract.
It may be argued that invoking these examples means switching to an
asymmetric information (agency) setting.  This need not be the case, however.
Even in a symmetrical information setting capture will take place, since even
here resources will have to be expended on verifying actions to third parties or
estimating economic consequences of capture that are unknown to all parties.
Minimizing resources expended on preventing capture (i.e., measurement and
enforcement costs) requires that measurement takes place at minimum cost.
This may, however, depend on whether measurement takes place within the
frame of an employment contract or within the frame of a contract between
independent parties. The employment contract confers to the employer the
right to monitor and sanction the employee in ways that for legal reasons
cannot be applied to an independent contractor. This means that the employer
is in a better position to choose where and when to monitor the exercise of
capture.  Thus, the employment contract will be chosen when it minimizes the
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costs of measuring capture.21 However, this conclusion can only be reached if
explicit allowance is made for that part of the institutional environment that
regulates the employment relation.
Costs of measuring are likely to be some positive function of the number
of attributes of the relevant assets, given a certain measurement technology.
Multi-attribute assets tend to imply the presence of many margins of
substitution (Demsetz 1988; Barzel 1997), some of which may not be specified ex
ante by the contractors.  In a broader context, Demsetz (1988: 18) points out that
“[t]he general conclusion is that constraining the ability of persons to exercise
specific rights of ownership causes them to rely in greater degree on substitute
margins in their attempt to maximize utility.”  Applied to the issue of the choice
between vertical integration and quasi-integration, this implies that multi-
attribute assets tend to produce a bias towards the employment contract (cf.
also Holmström and Milgrom 1991, 1994).  This is due to the adaptability
advantage of the employment contract. An employer’s constraining of an
employee’s abilities to exercise control in some directions likely results in the
employee substituting towards hitherto unspecified margins.  The employment
contract allows for adaptive handling of such behavior. 22
An interpretation of the above reasoning is that making room for agents’
capture of property rights over unspecified attributes in a setting characterized
by multi-attribute assets and positive costs of measurement and enforcement
adds to the explanatory power of the NPRA framework.   We pursue this
further in the following section.
                                                 
21   This can be interpreted in an agency theory framework (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991,
1994) as a reduction in the error in the signals of effort which agents produce in different tasks
due to more effective monitoring in employment relationships.
22  This is not to say that this is in any way the full explanation of the employment contract.
Other considerations, such as bargaining and communication costs, are also relevant.
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Toward a Broader Understanding of Ownership Patterns
In the preceding pages, we have implicitly extended the notion of residual
rights of control.  In the NPRA, these are rights to decide usages of assets in
future, uncontracted-for contingencies, and are derived from the legal
ownership of assets.  The rights of ownership of these assets are perfectly
enforced.  As we have pointed out, assuming perfect enforcement is tantamount
to making the notion of asset ownership completely dependent on a specific,
and – we think - unrealistic institutional set-up.
However, a more realistic setting characterized by less than perfect
enforcement, multi-attribute assets, and measurement costs must imply a
broader notion of residual rights of control.  This is because in such a setting a
number of attributes of assets are rationally left unspecified, and possibly also
unenforced.  Hence, they will be subject to capture attempts, that is, attempts at
being able to acquire and manipulate the services of various attributes without
compensating others on the margin.  Such capture may well go beyond the type
of capture treated in the NPRA where capture only relates to the hold-up
problem.  In a more realistic setting, minimizing the costs due to capture may
help determine ownership patterns in a way that is at variance with the NPRA.
In the latter, the costs of capture are only represented by inefficient investments.
However, there are other costs of capture, such as dissipation of wealth (Barzel
1997).  In the following example, we construct a stylized setting, in which these
costs are also included and help determine ownership patterns.
An Example
Consider a person, N, who considers whether to make a specific and non-
contractible investment in his human capital (repair skills) that makes his costs
of repairing three specific but identical cars lower than the prevailing market
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price of car repair.23 There are three potential drivers, A, B, and C of the specific
cars.  Moreover, we assume that N’s investment is complementary to the
human capital investments undertaken by A, B and C, in such a way that N
prefers to have the investing drivers as customers, and the investing drivers
prefer to have N repairing the cars.24  Thus, there are potential gains from trade.
We also assume that N’s marginal investment costs are much greater than A, B
and C’s costs.
This example stays close to the basic NPRA set-up.  And according to
NPRA logic, efficiency dictates that in the example ownership should be
allocated in such a way that N assumes ownership of the cars.  Otherwise he
will be held up by the owner(s) of the cars in the sense that they will share the
rents on N’s investments according to the Nash bargaining solution.  However,
we shall argue that a different ownership pattern may result, if provision is
made for the possibility that A, B and C can capture unspecified valued
attributes of the cars when N cannot perfectly verify such capture.
 The efficient rationing of the use of durable assets, such as the three cars,
requires not only that they are paid their marginal products, but also that they
are paid for use-induced depreciation. Use-induced depreciation may take
place with respect to a number of attributes of the car.  N has two options of
recovering use-induced depreciation, namely 1) to charge an ex ante price that is
independent of the actual (ex post) depreciation, or 2) to negotiate ex post a
charge reflecting the depreciation.  The problem with the first option is that of
                                                 
23  For example, we may assume that N specializes in repairing racing cars.  However, he still
preserves outside options, since he can continue to repair ordinary cars, although his
productivity in these options is not improved. Thus, his threat points is unchanged by his
human capital investment.
24  A, B, and C still preserve the option of driving non-specific cars or have their specific cars
repaired by another mechanic than N, but their utility from these outside options is not
improved by their human capital investments.  Thus, their threat points are unchanged by their
human capital investments.  To simplify the example, we also assume that A, B and C’s
marginal benefits of investing in their human capital are equal.
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moral hazard, while the problem with the second option is one of strategic
behavior under bargaining. Remedying both problems requires costly
verification of the actual depreciation.25
Assume, realistically, that it is costly to verify the depreciation of cars after
they have been used.26  This implies that an owner who rents out the cars will
confront costs that can be avoided by the owner/driver. Because of his
opportunity costs of time, an owner who rents out cars will rationally choose
not to verify the depreciation of some attributes.  Hence, he will not price these.
Assume also that it is less costly to carelessly drive than to carefully drive the
car, because careless driving reduces driving time.  This means that while an
owner/driver must trade-off time against depreciation and safety, the
renter/driver must only trade-off time against safety.27
We shall here concentrate on the situation where N is owner, and A, B and
C are renter/drivers, and examine whether this ownership pattern is efficient.
Consider Figure 1.
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 About Here XXXXXXXX
The figure shows the different opportunity cost schedules of the three drivers.
Driver A has high opportunity costs of careful driving while driver C has the
lowest opportunity costs of careful driving.   Also shown in the figure are three
cost lines.  The one that lies farthest to the north-east (i.e., hh) corresponds to
the cost-schedule confronted by a hypothetical owner/driver if N does not
                                                 
25 We abstract from reputation effects and effects from repeated interaction.  For example, one
may assume that only A, B and C can drive the cars and that the model is a finite horizon one.
26 We regard costs of verifying performance and contractual compliance as part of measurement
costs.
27  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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invest in his human capital or if the owner/driver drives a non-specific car.
This schedule reflects the market price for repair services for different degrees
of care.  For example, if driver A exercises the degree of care corresponding to
NAO, he will impose a depreciation on the car that can measured by the costs of
remedying that depreciation through repairing the car by others than N (i.e.,
QAO).  The opportunity cost schedules of A, B and C as owner/drivers cross this
schedule at the points (QAO, NAO), (QBO, NBO) and (QCO, NCO). These points
represent A, B, and C’s optimal trade-offs between the degree of care they
exercise and the costs of depreciation in a situation where either N has not
invested in his human or the driver/owners drive a non-specific car.
The cost line, jj corresponds to the cost schedule of repairing specific cars
confronted by N after having made a specific investment in his human capital
and with A, B, and C as customers.  It is closer to the origo than the hh line,
because the investment reduces N’s cost of repairing the specific cars.  For a
given degree of care, the vertical distance between the hh line and the jj line
represents the rents from N’s human capital investment if N were an owner and
if there were no costs of verifying depreciation.  This corresponds to the basic
set-up in NPRA (e.g., Hart 1995).  However, when he rents out the cars, he will
not perfectly verify depreciation, and this decreases the rents he can
appropriate.   This is different relative to the basic NPRA set-up.
The cost line, ii represents the market price of repair of the depreciation N
chooses to detect. For high degrees of care, he will choose to verify most of the
depreciation.  The vertical distance between the ii and the hh line indicates (for
any degree of care) the rent from N’s human capital investment that the
driver/renter captures.  The driver/renter can capture this rent because N
chooses not to verify the depreciation of certain attributes.28 The vertical
                                                                                                                                    
28  We simplify by assuming that the distance between hh and ii is the same for any degree of
care (and therefore for both driver/renters).  A possible interpretation is that certain attributes
are inherently more difficult to verify than others and therefore will be left unverified for any
27
distance between the ii and jj lines indicates for any degree of care the rent on
his own human capital investment that the owner himself can capture when
renting out the cars. We make the strong assumption that this line also shows
the division of rents between N and A, B and C, respectively, if they are owners
of the specific cars, that is, it shows A, B, and C’s abilities to hold-up N for half
of the rents on specific investment (for each repair service).  This also
corresponds to the basic NPRA set-up.  Given this set-up, what is the optimal
pattern? In particular, will N rationally choose to own all specific cars (bearing
in mind that according to NPRA logic, he should in fact own them all)?
Consider Figure 1 again.  N wishes to extract the maximum rents from his
investment; in turn, how much rent he can extract influences his incentives to
invest, as in the NPRA.  This means that he wishes to bring the rental price of
depreciation as close as possible to the opportunity costs to an owner/driver of
owning a non-specific car, that is, QAO, QBO and QCO in figure 1, where A, B and
C are indifferent between owning a non-specific car and renting a specific car.
However, N cannot reach these three points because of the costs of verifying
depreciation, and will accordingly charge for the depreciation at points that lie
below these points.
To find out what are the consequences of his inability to perfectly measure
depreciation, consider driver/renter C in figure 1.  In a first-best world of zero
costs of verification, total rents accruing to N would amount to be equal to the
vertical distance between hh and ii, measured at NCO that is, the difference
between the market cost of repair and N’s cost of repair.  However, given non-
zero costs of verification, N will charge C a rental price that reflects the market
price of repairing the verified depreciation (QCM).  Given this, C will adjust his
                                                                                                                                    
degree of care (and type of driver/renter).  A possible (self-experienced) example concerns
minor scratches on rental cars in Palermo, Sicily, where rental firms apparently expects any car
to be harmed in this way, which makes verifiability particularly costly.  One is thus not charged
for minor scratches.
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exercise of care accordingly (i.e., choose NCR).  This set of choices will induce a
sharing of rents equal to that obtaining if C owns the specific car.  Quite similar
operations may be performed with respect to driver A and C.
Recall from figure 1 that QCO is the charge that leaves C indifferent
between being an owner and being a renter, when he is paying the full marginal
costs for the depreciation he imposes on the car.  Thus, if C is a renter, N can at
most choose a mark-up on the rental services amounting to QCO - QCM.  This
mark-up may reflect both measurement costs and N’s attempt to extract more
rents of the driver/renters.
As the opportunity cost schedules of the drives are drawn in Figure 1, N
can impose a higher mark-up on B and an even higher one on A, leaving them
indifferent between being an owner of a non-specific car and being a renter of a
specific car.   N’s overall optimization problem is to choose the mark-up such
that the rent he can extract from all drivers is maximized.   If he chooses a too
high value of the mark-up, he will induce one or more of the drivers to switch
to non-specific cars, making him loose rents on repair services.  Therefore, it
will be efficient for him to let these drivers own a specific car, continue to repair
their cars, and allow them to extract half of the rents on his investment.29  This
may imply the existence of an equilibrium in which A and B are renter/drivers
and C is an owner/driver.  This is because A and B’s gain from not being fully
marginally charged for the depreciation they impose on the car he drives is not
overwhelmed by the mark-up.
Implications and Discussion
The above example has shown that capture, costly measurement
(verification) and different types of individuals (A, B and C) may explain who
owns an asset.  Moreover, although it stays very close to the basic NPRA set-up,
the example tells a story that contradicts the NPRA prediction that an
29
individual who undertakes a human asset investment that is specific to some
physical assets should also be the owner of those assets.  Ownership may fall in
the hands of C rather than N in the example, not in order to create threat points
under ex post bargaining and avoid inefficient (i.e., third-best) investments, but
in order to avoid a mark-up.  Ultimately, the mark-up arises as a consequence
of the driver/renters’ capture of unspecified use rights over the car which leads
to depreciation of the cars, costly attempts to verify this depreciation on the part
N, and an imposition of a mark-up that is uniform over the driver/renters
because of N’s costs of verifying depreciation.
Note that, like in the NPRA, there is a link between the economic function
of ownership in the example and the legal system.  This link is established
through the notion of costly verification, although in a way that differs from the
NPRA.  Costly verification influences who owns an asset, not because it creates
a hold-up problem (as in the NPRA), but because it makes it costly to charge a
correct marginal price of rental services.
Although ownership is structured to minimize capture, the example thus
suggests that this structuring can take place in ways that differ from the NPRA
model. In turn this suggests that the NPRA model is a special case of a more
encompassing model of ownership – yet to be fully formally developed - in
which the notion of capture of unspecified attributes also include those that are
left unspecified due to measurement costs.  To illustrate the partial nature of the
basic NPRA set-up, NPRA conclusions may be derived from the basic setting of
the above example.  Recall that NPRA reasoning would lead to the conclusion
that N should own all cars.  In the context of the example, this requires that an
incentive contract is made between the owner and the renters of the cars.  The
contract makes the charge contingent on the verified depreciation.  Moreover,
the verification of all attributes has to be sufficiently precisely so that an agent
                                                                                                                                    
29  We assume that wealth constraints are absent.
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has a sufficient belief that he will be charged a correct rent.  Otherwise, some of
the renter/drivers may still prefer to be owners.
In their multi-task agency models, Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994)
arrive at conclusions that are somewhat related to the ones above.  What they
call “multi-tasking” is thus one representation of the multi-attribute nature of
many assets.  Relatedly, they also stress measurement costs.  However, in
contrast to this paper, they assume risk-aversion on the part of agents and
asymmetric information.   We only assume risk-neutrality and a certain degree
of non-verifiability. Most importantly, however, in the Holmström and
Milgrom models, capture is seen as function of measurement errors on signals
on effort whereas in our example, capture is a function of purposefully leaving
certain attributes unspecified.  This means that in our example an incentive
contract will not diminish the amount of capture.
Conclusion
The notion of asset ownership is one of the most vexing ones in economics. This
is partly because the notion is highly context-specific and hard to discuss in
isolation from legal considerations (Demsetz 1998).  This has produced a certain
amount of confusion.  On this background, it is hardly surprising that the
NPRA has emerged as a dominant approach to the study of ownership and the
economics of organization.  It is seen (and advertised) as a clear formal
approach that unambiguously defines the notion of asset ownership and builds
a theory of economic organization on that basis.
However, in this paper, we have argued that the clarity of the NPRA is
acquired at the cost of narrowness and a certain lack of explanatory power ¾ a
critique that we have developed by viewing NPRA ideas through a lens
provided by the OPRA.  Specifically, we have argued that the NPRA
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conceptualization of ownership as fully enforceable residual rights of control is
too narrow with respect to identifying the nature and function of ownership.
The NPRA neglects the difference between the legally defined structure of
ownership (the holding of titles to assets) and the structure of ownership over
attributes of assets that emerges from agents’ capture.  This also means that
ownership only partakes of the role of a bargaining chip in situations of
bilateral monopoly, and the role played by ownership of minimizing the costs
of capture is only partially reflected in the NPRA.
A possible implication is that, in spite of its clarity and elegance, the NPRA
is not an unambiguous scientific advance over the OPRA.  Another implication
is that there is room for cross-fertilization between the OPRA and the NPRA.
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